We investigate a prominent allegation in Congressional hearings that Moody's loosened its standards for assigning credit ratings after it went public in the year 2000 in an attempt to chase market share and increase revenue. We exploit a difference-in-difference design by benchmarking Moody's ratings with those assigned by its rival S&P before and after 2000. Consistent with Congressional allegations, we find that Moody's credit ratings for new and outstanding corporate bonds are significantly more favorable to issuers relative to S&P's after Moody's initial public offering (IPO) in 2000. The higher ratings assigned by Moody's after its IPO are more pronounced for clients that are large issuers of structured finance products and operate in the financial industry, suggesting that easier ratings standards emanated in the structured finance products group of Moody's. Moody's ratings are more favorable for clients where Moody's is likely to face larger conflicts of interest: (i) large issuers; and (ii) firms that are more likely to benefit from higher ratings, on the margin. Moody's higher ratings, post IPO, are also less informative as captured by expected default frequencies (EDFs). Our findings have implications for incentives created by a public offering for capital market gatekeepers and professional firms.
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has spurred an active debate on why the major credit rating agencies failed to downgrade the ratings of structured finance products in a timely manner. Much of the academic debate has focused on the conflicts of interest inherent in the issuer-pay model followed by credit rating agencies.
1 However, relatively little attention has been devoted to the incentives created by the public or private ownership structure of the rating agencies. In this paper,
we investigate whether the quality of credit ratings assigned by Moody's systematically declined after it went public in 2000.
Moody's was founded in 1900 to produce manuals of performance statistics related to stocks and bonds. Xia (2010) , Kraft (2011) , Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) , Bonsall (2012) , Jiang, Stanford and Xie (2012) and Cornaggia and Cornaggia (2013) . 2 Similar concerns were raised when Goldman Sachs went public. For instance, one partner was worried that "the public company could never replicate the close-knit culture of a partnership, where financial rewards are measured in lifetimes instead of months." (Kahn 1998). realized, absolutely tilted the balance away from an independent arbiter of risk towards a captive facilitator of risk transfer."
We begin by comparing credit ratings on new corporate bonds that were rated by both
Moody's and S&P. To study the impact of Moody's IPO on its credit ratings, we compare the difference in its ratings of corporate bonds before and after it went public in 2000. The period prior to going public ("pre-public period") spans 1995 to 1999, and the period after going public ("postpublic period") extends from 2001 to 2005. To control for potential time based variation in corporate credit rating standards (Jorion, Liu and Shi 2006 , Cheng and Nematiu 2009 , Becker and Milbourn 2011 and Alp 2012 and changes in the nature of corporate bonds issued in the two periods, we employ a difference-in-difference methodology. In particular, we benchmark Moody's ratings for a common set of corporate bonds to those assigned by its closest rival, Standards & Poor (S&P), and then evaluate whether relative to S&P's, Moody's ratings, on average across all corporate bonds, were higher after Moody's IPO than before.
Although the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was mainly concerned with
Moody's push for market share of structured debt products, we study the impact of Moody's IPO on its ratings for corporate bonds. A culture of catering to client needs that started in the structured finance products group was allegedly transmitted to other products such as corporate bonds.
Moreover, employees pointed to a change in compensation criteria that involved rewarding compliant analysts with promotions, bonuses and stock options. These compensation practices, emanating from the structured products group, also facilitated the migration of the new client centric culture to other groups within Moody's.
Studying corporate bonds has four advantages. First, most of the corporate bonds in the U.S. are rated by both Moody's and S&P. Hence, we can construct a sample of comparable securities with little selection bias. In contrast, many structured finance products are not rated by both Moody's and S&P. Second, corporate bonds are an established product with a long time series of relevant data, whereas there is relatively little issuance of mortgage backed securities
To test whether the loosening of Moody's rating standards for corporate bonds emanated from its structured finance products group, as alleged in the Congressional hearings, we collect data on the issuers of structured products from the ABS database managed by J.P. Morgan's Asset Backed Alert. The structured products included are asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgagebacked securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). We find that Moody's rating is significantly more favorable, relative to S&P's, for corporate bonds issued by large issuers of structured finance products. Moreover, after going public, Moody's is relatively more favorable towards bond issues by financial firms, who, as a group, are more likely to issue structured finance products.
The culture of catering to the needs of important clients likely permeated to other important corporate bond issuers, irrespective of their involvement in structured finance products. In particular, large and frequent issuers of corporate bonds account for a significant share of the credit rating agencies' revenues. Therefore, we investigate whether large issuers of corporate bonds are also likely to experience a greater loosening of credit ratings by Moody's, relative to S&P.
Consistent with this conjecture, we find that although the large issuers got a tougher rating from
Moody's relative to S&P in the pre-public period, they received a relatively more favorable rating from Moody's in its post-public period.
We also identify bonds whose credit ratings are on the margin and can hence benefit from a higher rating from Moody's. Bongaerts, Cremers and Goetzmann (2012) document that firms with lower ratings often shop for higher ratings from other agencies to serve as a tiebreaker. Among all the bonds in any rating class of S&P, the bonds at the top of the rating class are those with the highest operating profits, and these could potentially take advantage of a higher credit rating from Moody's. We find that prior to its IPO, Moody's was relatively tougher on these bond issuers, but tended to go easy on such issuers after its IPO.
We next investigate changes in Moody's ratings, post IPO, on all the outstanding bonds rated, as opposed to new bond issues alone. One way to address this question is to examine whether Moody's became tardier at downgrading bonds after it went public. However, comparing the timeliness of rating changes across rating agencies is challenging because rating changes by different rating agencies often occur at different levels and at different magnitudes. Therefore, it is difficult to identify the same rating change by Moody's and S&P, and then ascertain which agency is faster in its rating action. To account for these constraints, we compute a new measure that captures, on a daily basis, whether Moody's assigned a higher rating than S&P. The resultant daily indicator variable is averaged over the year to capture the fraction of the year for which Moody's assigned a higher rating. Our measure, LeadTimeDiff, is the difference in the fraction of the year where Moody's rating is better minus the fraction of the year where S&P's rating is better, for an outstanding bond. A positive (negative) value of LeadTimeDiff implies that, on average, Moody's has a higher (lower) number of days with a higher rating on outstanding bonds relative to S&P.
We find that LeadTimeDiff is significantly higher in the post-public period. Furthermore, we show that LeadTimeDiff in the post-public period is significantly higher for bonds (i) issued by large structured products issuers, (ii) issued by financial firms, (iii) issued by large corporate bond issuers; and (iv) that are on the margin, as described earlier, and would hence gain significantly by procuring a higher rating. In summary, after going public, Moody's tends to assign higher ratings than S&P for outstanding bonds as well.
The data thus far show that Moody's gives higher ratings relative to S&P after it went public in 2000. However, a skeptic could assert that Moody's more favorable ratings could potentially be more informative about bonds' eventual default. To assess this conjecture, we follow Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2009) and estimate the Distance-to-Default measure for each bond in our sample based on the Black-Scholes-Merton specification. The relative accuracy of Moody's ratings, as captured by the expected default frequency (EDF) measure, decreased after it went public in 2000. Such lower accuracy is observed for both the new bond issue sample as well as for all outstanding bond issues. In summary, using EDF, a standard benchmark for evaluating the accuracy of a credit rating, also points to impaired rating standards by Moody's after it went public.
Although we benchmark Moody's ratings to S&P's, we hasten to add that our paper does not say anything about absolute credit standards or the absence of ratings related problems at S&P.
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The results are consistent with both Moody's and S&P assigning higher ratings to chase market share but Moody's assigned significantly higher ratings than S&P in its post public period.
We perform several robustness tests. Going public allows for sharper managerial incentives and potentially gives the firm greater control over compensation criteria that are relevant for its business. Thus, the Moody's IPO could have achieved the opposite result by fostering the maintenance and strengthening of credit ratings standards. However, as modeled by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , when agents are involved in multiple tasks, such as increasing market share along with maintaining credit rating standards in the case of credit analysts, it may not be desirable to provide strong incentives for the activity that can be effectively measured as the agent will likely neglect the activity that cannot be effectively measured. Because measuring revenues is easier than measuring adherence to credit ratings standards or even eventual default, the act of going public and the availability of sharper incentives via stock options may have precipitated the high ratings at Moody's. As discussed later in the paper, there is a large literature that has documented the pressures faced by public firms to meet revenue and earnings target and the negative behavior that such pressures can potentially engender.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature by documenting the potential impact of stock market pressures on the quality of credit ratings at Moody's subsequent to its IPO. The extant literature has instead concentrated on the conflicts induced by the issuer-pay model on the quality of rating. Our findings have implications for the impact of ownership structures on the independence of gatekeepers to financial markets such as auditors, lawyers and underwriters.
Traditionally, these gatekeepers have been organized as privately-held companies or partnerships (e.g., the Big Four audit firms) to avoid potential conflicts between clients and public shareholders.
Our results suggest that such conflicts are real and can potentially impact the independence of capital market gatekeepers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background, and Section 3 explains the research design. Section 4 reports the data and empirical analyses.
Section 5 examines the changes in the informativeness of Moody's ratings as captured by the EDF measure. Section 6 conducts several robustness tests on our results and finally, section 7 offers concluding remarks.
Background and Congressional Allegations

Ownership Status of other Gatekeepers
Gatekeepers such as lawyers, accountants and finance professionals, who assist the company in raising public funds, are crucial to the smooth operation of capital markets. 
Literature on the negative impact of going public
The literature suggests two reasons why going public might create incentives for the firm to deviate from the "first best" level of outcomes. First, going public necessarily splits ownership from management (Berle and Means 1932, Jensen and Meckling 1976) , which, in turn, can create agency problems when the interests of the manager diverge from those of the owners. One version of this agency problem is highlighted in the models of "managerial myopia" such as those advocated by Stein (1989) . He suggests that the public-firm's manager will make decisions that deviate from "first best" choices if he has utility for the firm's short-run stock price. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) find survey evidence that a majority of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) would not be averse to giving up positive net present value projects to meet analyst-consensus estimates of quarterly earnings. Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms that barely beat analysts' earnings forecasts cut discretionary R&D and advertising spending to avoid the short-run stock price decline stemming from missing earnings forecasts as documented in Skinner and Sloan (2002) , although such cuts lead to underperformance over longer horizons.
Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2012) find that publicly listed firms invest less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to similar, matched private firms, especially in industries in which stock prices are particularly sensitive to current earnings. Several other papers document that managers with agency-related incentives cut R&D or marketing expenditure (e.g., Baber et al. 1991 , Dechow and Sloan 1991 , Bushee 1998 , Roychowdhury 2006 , Mizik and Jacobsen 2007 , Cohen, Mashruwala and Zach 2010 , and Chapman and Steenburgh 2011 .
Second, the liquidity associated with the stock's listing on public exchanges also makes it easier for concentrated shareholders to sell rather than hold the stock, monitor the firm and force value-increasing changes on management (Bhide 1993) . In contrast, privately held firms are usually owned by holders with concentrated holdings, which are inherently illiquid. These characteristics, on the margin, create incentives for owners in private firms to exercise better governance of the manager's actions. Large and active shareholders in a public firm can potentially achieve similar results by monitoring. The 2001 proxy statement filed by Moody's right after it went public, lists two concentrated owners who hold at least 5% of its shares: (i)
Harris Associates LP at 5.28% and (ii) Berkshire Hathaway at 14.98%. Berkshire Hathaway, though it owns a large stake, is known for a hands-off approach in managing its investees (Bowen et al. 2012) . Consistent with this philosophy, Warren Buffett (2010) testified to the FCIC that he had no knowledge of how Moody's assigns ratings. Harris Associates LP ownership stake drops below 5% in the subsequent quarter and continues to stay below 5%. In sum, Moody does not appear to have large shareholders that actively monitor its operations.
Impact of going public on Moody's: employee testimonials
Before going public, Moody's had branded itself with notions of integrity, commitment, and expertise.
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At the FCIC hearings, one of the analysts described the corporate culture at Moody's before going public as follows: "Moody's analysts were proud to work for what they believed was by far the best of the rating agencies. They viewed Moody's competitors as a very distant second in quality and ratings integrity" (Froeba 2010) . The rapid promotions of Brian Clarkson signaled that the culture advocated by the structured finance side had won. Bond analysts, even in the pre-IPO days, regularly faced pressure to issue favorable ratings, but Moody's had always backed them when they resisted. After
Clarkson's ascension, the corporate bond side was likely unable to resist the pressure to be favorable to issuers. This would be especially pertinent if the issuers were large players in the structured products and whose business Moody's was trying to win.
Employees have asserted that the increase in market share, especially for structured products, was achieved in two ways: (i) via fears of reprisal; and (ii) by encouraging investment banker clients. According to employee testimonials, the reprisals consisted of a pattern of rewarding compliant analysts with promotions, bonuses and stock options and intimidating analysts that were not compliant with the threat of dismissal. In particular, performance appraisals of analysts valued market coverage, revenue, market outreach, ratings quality, and development of analytical tools. However, evaluating employees on the quality of ratings is difficult in real time as the predictive ability of a rating can take years to validate. Hence, greater emphasis was placed on revenue and market share, consistent with the predictions of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) model discussed in the introduction. This change in evaluating and promoting employees that began in the structured products group was allegedly adopted across the entire firm.
At the same time, Moody's tried to reach out to their investment banker clients. Froeba (2010) testified that "investment banks had learned that Moody's would allow them to ask that all of the bank's deals be assigned to the same particularly "flexible" analyst or team of analysts."
They had also learned that they could go over the heads of analysts (even of rating committees despite Moody's policies to the contrary) if they should ever really need to do so by appealing directly to Moody's managers and senior managers." about business, but the quality of ratings matters even more: "I think that Moody's has always been focused on business… but ratings quality, getting the ratings to the best possible predictive content, predictive status, is paramount." He blamed unforeseen conditions in the housing market when he testified to the FCIC: "we believed that our ratings were our best opinion at the time that we assigned them. As we obtained new information and were able to update our judgments based on the new information and the trends we were seeing in the housing market, we made what I think are appropriate changes to our ratings" (Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 2011, page 208). 
Research Design
To explore whether Moody's standards for assigning credit ratings loosened following its IPO in 2000, we begin by analyzing the difference in its ratings of new corporate bond issues during the pre-and post-public periods. Merely comparing Moody's ratings before and after its IPO is subject to obvious criticisms that such changes may capture overall trends in the industry.
For instance, Alp (2012) documents a structural shift toward more stringent credit ratings in 2002. Becker and Milbourn (2011) find that greater competition from a bigger Fitch negatively impacted 8 In the literature on the potential conflict of interest induced by the "issuer pays" model (e.g., Jiang et al. 2012), skeptics (e.g., Bonsall 2012) have pointed out that the issuer pays model enables the rated company to provide the rating agency with non-public information that might actually make the rating more informative. The "informativeness" defense seems less germane to the incentives imposed on the rating agency by going public. That is, the access to the rated company does not change in our setting for Moody's due to its IPO or for it rival S&P.
standards for credit quality at all rating agencies. Ratings quality are also impacted by the issuer pay model. Cornaggia, Cornaggia and Xia (2012) find that conflict of interest for credit analysts leaving to join the issuer firm impacts ratings. Moreover, the pressure to increase market share and its impact on rating standards was likely felt by all rating agencies and not just Moody's.
Specifically, the drive for market share was also emphasized at S&P, Moody's primary competitor (Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 2011). One former S&P Managing ratings to large issuers, who likely generate more business and higher fees for these agencies. Therefore, an alternate hypothesis is that S&P, Moody's chief competitor, was equally susceptible to maximizing short term profits and to investment banker pressure. That is, the act of Moody's going public, per se, did not affect ratings quality.
To address these concerns, we employ a difference-in-difference methodology by benchmarking Moody's rating of a bond to that assigned by S&P. Specifically, we estimate the 9 Other literature on ratings of structured finance products includes An, Deng and Sanders (2008) , Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) and Griffin and Tang (2012 (2004) suggestions and ignore the time series to just examine one year before and one year after Moody's IPO. These results using two years of data are discussed in Section 6 and do not impact our results.
The second aspect of our research design is the focus on the credit rating of corporate bonds. Recent congressional hearings regarding Moody's quest to gain market share by loosening rating standards following its IPO were primarily focused on structured products. However, as discussed before, studying corporate bonds has several advantages. Along with the advantages listed earlier, it should be noted that the risk assessment models for corporate bonds are relatively established, unlike those for structured finance products. Hence, it becomes harder to argue that any differences in ratings between Moody's and S&P are attributable to (i) differential learning about the nature of the financial products between these agencies; or to (ii) important innovations in the structuring and delivery of such products. As Kroezner and Shiller (2011, page 59) assert, corporate bonds are less opaque than structured finance products because there is a substantial amount of public information available about corporate debt. Consequently, the "information advantage" that a credit rating agency might have compared to an industry analyst in rating a corporate bond, relative to a structured finance product, is not great. This feature reduces Moody's opportunity to rate bonds favorably, which in turn would make it harder for us to detect the effect of the IPO on its ratings of corporate bonds.
Data and Results
We obtain data on bond characteristics, such as issue size, offering date, and maturity date, 
Univariate analysis
To study the difference in the initial ratings assigned by Moody's and S&P for new issues, we create the variable RatingDiff, which is the numerical value of the S&P rating minus the numerical value of the Moody's rating for the same bond issue. As favorable ratings are coded as smaller values, a positive value of RatingDiff means that Moody's rated the new issue as better quality credit relative to S&P.
Compustat at the time of issuance. Further, we exclude bonds where the initial rating by Moody's and S&P are different by four or more notches. This mismatch is most likely attributable to errors but such mismatches account for less than 1% of the bond issues. 13 The reported results in this paper hold when we expand our sample to include bonds issued by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The results after inclusion of Freddie and Fannie bonds are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
As seen in Table 3 , in the pre-public period, there were 5,722 new issues with a mean
RatingDiff of -0.302. The negative number implies that Moody's assigned, on average, a tougher credit rating than S&P in the five years prior to going public. The average RatingDiff in the postpublic period, however, is 0.286, implying that in the five years following its IPO, Moody's, on average, assigned a higher credit rating relative to S&P. The move from -0.302 in the pre-public period to the 0.286 in the post-public period is statistically significant at the 1% level. In sum,
Moody's was significantly more likely to assign a higher rating of more than half a notch relative to S&P in the years after its IPO.
We also examine how RatingDiff changes over the individual years around Moody's IPO. To ensure that the results are not driven by a few extreme observations, we also examine the median values of RatingDiff. Although the median of RatingDiff is zero for both periods, the distribution of RatingDiff moves significantly towards the positive end, or towards higher ratings by Moody's after its IPO. To ascertain whether this relative loosening of Moody's standards after its IPO is restricted to a few classes of bonds, we examine the rating differences separately for investment-grade and high-yield bonds. As shown in Table 3 , Moody's relatively looser standards post-IPO are apparent in all cases. For the subsample of bonds which received a high-yield rating from at least one of the two agencies, we find that Moody's is tougher than S&P both before and after the IPO, though it is relatively less tough after the IPO.
Multivariate analysis
The univariate tests yield significant evidence consistent with the Congressional allegations. In this section, we verify whether these results hold in a multivariate set up. To capture the impact of the IPO on RatingDiff, we create an indicator variable, post2000Dum, that takes the value of one for all bonds issued after 2000, i.e., in the post-public period, and zero otherwise. We then regress RatingDiff on post2000Dum. If Moody's loosened its standards for assigning credit ratings following IPO, as hypothesized earlier, we would expect the coefficient of post2000Dum to be positive and significant.
In addition, we control for a host of issuer and bond characteristics in line with those employed by prior work (Pinches and Mingo 1973 , Kaplan and Urwitz 1979 , Blume, Lim and Mckinlay 1998 , Campbell and Taskler 2003 , and Jiang, Stanford and Xie 2012 . Specifically, we include variables pertaining to the issuing firm: (i) the firm's size using the logarithm of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt (IssuerSize), (ii) leverage which is the ratio of longterm debt to total assets (Leverage); (iii) firm performance using the ratio of operating performance before depreciation to sales (OpMargin); and (iv) firm volatility as measured by the standard deviation of stock returns (Stkretstd). All accounting variables are of annual frequency, belonging to the fiscal year prior to the issuance of the new bond, and issuer volatility is estimated from daily stock returns in the year prior to the new issue. We also include bond specific variables: (i) the logarithm of the par value of the bond issue (IssueSize), (ii) the number of years to maturity (YTM),
and (iii) a dummy variable for whether the issue is senior debt (SeniorDum). It is likely that
Moody's rating models for issuers or bonds with specific characteristics changes after its IPO, relative to S&P's model. To control for this potential confound, we include interactions of all the control variables with post2000Dum. In summary, we estimate the following empirical model: As shown in Column I of Table 4 , in a simple difference-in-difference setting, the coefficient on post2000Dum is 0.585 and is significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that, subsequent to its IPO, Moody's ratings get better by more than half of a rating notch, which is a magnitude of easing that is both statistically and economically significant. Our results are qualitatively unchanged in Column II where we include all the control variables. The coefficient on post2000Dum is positive and significant at the 1% level, and the magnitude is higher at 0.851.
With respect to the control variables, Moody's is relatively tougher on firms with higher operating margins and those with high stock volatility. Relative to S&P, Moody's weighs bond characteristics differently as well. Moody's assigns higher ratings to bond issues that are larger and have shorter maturity while being tougher on senior issues. This tendency is partly reversed in the post-public period. Overall, the results suggest that Moody's model for assessing credit quality based on bond and issuer characteristics significantly changes after its IPO. More important, controlling for this potential change in their credit rating process does not impact the coefficient on post2000Dum. In summary, the evidence supports the findings of the univariate test that Moody's assigns relatively higher ratings for new bond issues in the years after its IPO.
To explore what causes the relatively higher ratings by Moody's following its IPO, and also to shed some light on individual rating agencies, we examine ratings assigned by each agency separately. In Column III of Table 4 , we re-estimate model (1) by using Moody's ratings, instead of RatingDiff, as the dependent variable. The coefficient of post2000Dum is negative (-0.935) and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that Moody's assigns more favorable ratings after its IPO in 2000. However, when we examine the ratings assigned by S&P (Column IV), we find the coefficient of post2000Dum to be -0.084, which is not statistically significant. These results indicate that the increase in RatingDiff following Moody's IPO appears to be driven by higher ratings from Moody's, rather than from stricter ratings assigned by S&P.
Cross sectional results
The results so far document a relative loosening of rating standards at Moody's after it went public in 2000. As discussed earlier, this was likely caused by a move to a client centric culture that started in the structured products group. If the culture of laxity in ratings was directed towards winning market share in structured finance products, then the post IPO laxity in ratings should be stronger for corporate bond issuers that also issue the most structured finance products.
Catering to these clients by giving them a higher rating in their corporate bond issues will increase the likelihood of securing their ratings business for structured finance products. To examine this conjecture, we obtain information on the issuance of structured products, including asset-backed Table 5 ). We manually link the names of bond issuers in our sample with those in the ABS database. The top 40 issuers of structured products in every year, accounting for an average of 69.2% of total issuance, are classified as large structured product issuers.
To examine Moody's ratings of corporate bonds by large structured products issuers, we estimate the following model: Table 6 . The coefficient on the interaction of HighConfDum with post2000dum is positive and highly significant. After going public in 2000, Moody's assigned significantly higher ratings than S&P to corporate bond issues of large structured products issuers. The coefficient on HighConfDum is not significant suggesting that Moody's ratings of corporate bonds issued by large structured products issuers were not different from S&P ratings before Moody's went public. The coefficient on post2000dum continues to be positive and significant as before. In summary, Moody's ratings on all new issues was better than S&P after it went public, and it was significantly more favorable for new corporate bond issues by large structured products issuers.
We also create another proxy for issuers active in the structured products market. As most of the structured products are issued by financial firms, we construct an indicator variable labeled as Findum that takes the value of one if the firm operates in the following industries: Banking, Credit/Financing, Real Estate, and Savings & Loan. 15 In this specification (Column II of Table 6 ), the HighConfDum takes the value of one if the bond is issued by a firm in the finance industry.
The coefficient on HighConfDum is positive and significant implying that Moody's always gave higher ratings than S&P for issues by financial firms. However, after going public, this tilt towards clients significantly increased -the coefficient on the interaction of post200dum and HighConfDum is positive and significant.
Next, we study whether, over time, the culture of catering to clients spread to ratings of large corporate bond issuers, irrespective of their connection to structured products. Specifically, issue is large and is issued by a large issuing firm, and zero otherwise. As shown in Column III of Table 6 , the coefficient on the interaction of HighConfDum with post2000Dum is positive and significant, and the coefficient on HighConfDum is negative and significant. That is, before its IPO, Moody's was relatively tough on these large issuers. However, Moody's became significantly more favorable towards these large issuers after going public in 2000. The coefficient of post2000Dum continues to be positive and significant suggesting that though the relatively loosening of credit ratings after going public is seen for all new issues, it is significantly higher for new large issues by large issuers.
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Next, we identify bond issues that are on the margin and could benefit from getting a higher rating. In particular, we examine all new issues in a rating class assigned by S&P. Among the issuers in any rating class, some are relatively more profitable and almost qualify for a higher rating relative to the one assigned to them by S&P. Obtaining a higher rating from a competitor As seen in Column IV of Table 6 , the coefficient on the HighConfDum, newly defined based on operating profits, is negative and significant, and its interaction with post2000Dum is positive and significant. Consistent with previous results, Moody's is relatively tougher on these high conflict of interest issuers in the period prior to 2000 but loosens up after 2000. The coefficient of post2000Dum continues to be positive and significant in this specification as well.
Outstanding bonds
The preceding section provides consistent evidence on the relative loosening of Moody's credit ratings of bond issuers after its IPO in 2000. In this section, we examine whether the relative loosening of credit ratings is also seen in the ratings on outstanding bonds. A direct way to address this question is to compare the timeliness of rating changes across rating agencies before and after Moody's went public. However, examining which agency is faster in its rating action requires the identification of same rating changes by both agencies, which is challenging given that rating changes by different agencies often occur at different levels and at different magnitudes. For instance, consider a typical case with three rating events: (i) S&P downgrades a bond from AA-to A+ in May 1999; (ii) Moody's downgrades the same bond by two notches, from AA to A, in July 1999; and (iii) finally, S&P downgrades the bond again from A+ to A-in September 1999. This example highlights the difficulty in identifying a rating change from the same level and with the same magnitude by both rating agencies, rendering the direct comparisons in the timeliness of rating migrations across rating agencies rather difficult.
To capture these disparate levels, magnitudes and timing in rating changes, we estimate a measure of the differences between Moody's and S&P ratings on a daily basis. Specifically, we create an indicator variable, Moody'sLeadDum, which is set equal to one if Moody's assigned a higher rating than S&P for a particular bond on a particular day, and zero otherwise.
S&PLeadDum is created in a similar way. To capture the fraction of the year for which Moody's rating is better than S&P's, we create a new variable, LeadTimeDiff, which is the average value of
Moody'sLeadDum for the year minus the average value of the S&PLeadDum over the same year for the same bond. A positive value of LeadTimeDiff suggests that Moody's has a higher rating than S&P for a higher fraction of the year for that bond. Note that the average value of
LeadTimeDiff should be zero if (i) there are no differences between the ratings assigned by the two agencies for the bond; or if (ii) the differences between the ratings assigned by these two agencies are randomly distributed across bonds and time.
In line with the model for new issues, we estimate a similar model for all outstanding bonds using LeadTimeDiff as the dependent variable. As seen in Column I of Table 7 , the coefficient on post2000Dum is positive and highly significant (coefficient = 0.301, p-value < 0.01),
confirming that Moody's had a more favorable rating than S&P, on average, for outstanding bonds after its IPO in 2000.
Similar to the earlier analysis with new bond issues, we examine whether greater loosening of Moody's credit ratings occurs for clients that are large issuers of structured finance products and those with higher conflicts of interest. Consistent with the results for new issues, we find outstanding corporate bonds issued by large structured products issuers have a higher rating from
Moody's relative to S&P after 2000. As seen in Column II of Table 7 , the coefficient of interaction of post200dum and HighConfDum is positive and significant. Results are qualitatively similar when we use bonds issued by financial firms to proxy for issuance of structured products (see Column III). In summary, although Moody's gives higher ratings than S&P across all bonds after 2000, the loosening of credit ratings is significantly higher for large issuers of structured products and for financial issuers after 2000.
Next, we study whether the culture of catering to clients extends to important issuers in corporate bonds. Similar to the previous section, we use two proxies of higher conflicts of interest.
The first proxy for high conflicts of interest is large issuers, as defined in the previous section (see Column IV) . The second proxy is to identify firms that likely just missed a higher S&P rating as in the prior section (Column V). We find that (i) the coefficient on post2000dum is positive and significant suggesting higher ratings by Moody's relative to S&P after 2000 on average for all outstanding bonds; and (ii) a significant coefficient on the interaction of HighconfDum and post200dum in line with the view that Moody's granted significantly higher ratings to large issuers of corporate bonds and to those that just missed higher S&P ratings after it went public in 2000.
Note that the coefficient on Highconfdum in Column IV is negative and significant pointing to Moody's tendency to be tough on large issuers of corporate bonds, relative to S&P, prior to going public in 2000 but to be significantly more favorable after 2000. In summary, the results for outstanding bonds mirror those for new issues.
Informativeness of Moody's Rating following its IPO
In this section, we examine whether the informativeness of ratings assigned by Moody's changes after it went public. Following Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2009), we first estimate the Distance-to-Default measure based on the Black-Scholes-Merton specification. This specification implies that the expected default frequency is the cumulative standard normal distribution function valued at the negative distance to default. Based on market equity data and COMPUSTAT balance sheet data, we use an iterative method to estimate this measure for each bond-year in our sample.
If Moody's relatively higher rating after 2000, as documented in prior sections, is justified, these higher relative ratings should be associated with a lower EDF. However, if these relatively higher ratings by Moody's after 2000 are a reflection of loosening standards, then such ratings should be associated with a higher EDF. In other words, a positive Ratingdiff -pointing to a higher rating by Moody's relative to S&P -suggests that Moody's is relatively more accurate if such a rating difference is associated with a lower expected default frequency. However, a positive association between Ratingdiff and EDF points to lower accuracy of Moody's rating relative to S&P's. The same intuition holds for a positive association between Leadtimediff and EDF for outstanding bonds.
We investigate this conjecture for both our samples of new issues and outstanding bonds.
We include the estimate of EDF and the interaction of EDF with post200dum in our base models for new issues where the dependent variable is Ratingdiff. As displayed in Column I of Table 8 , the coefficient on EDF is negative and significant whereas the coefficient on EDF with post2000dum is positive and significant. Moody's was relatively more accurate than S&P in the period prior to going public. However, after 2000, the data suggests a significant decrease in the accuracy of Moody's ratings relative to S&P. Similarly for all outstanding bond issues, displayed in Column II, the coefficient on EDF is negative and significant; whereas the coefficient on the interaction of EDF with post2000dum is positive and significant. The relative accuracy of Moody's ratings, as captured by the EDF measure, decreased after it went public in 2000.
These results negate concerns that Moody's move towards higher ratings after 2000 was the result of a strategy designed to increase the informativeness of their ratings and not due to loosening ratings standards. In short, tests that reply on another standard benchmark for evaluating the accuracy of credit ratings also points to Moody's loosening rating standards after it went public.
Robustness Tests
In this section, we examine the robustness of our results to three specification checks. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to (i) longer time periods that include the financial crisis; (ii) shorter time windows that focus more narrowly on the IPO event; and (3) using Fitch as an alternative benchmark.
Impact of the financial crisis
We investigate whether our results are robust to the inclusion of the unique circumstances associated with the financial crisis. Our research design thus far has relied on data five years Table 9 , studying the nine year window before and after the IPO does not impact our results. The coefficient of post2000dum continues to be positive and highly significant for both new issues and outstanding issues.
Shorter time period around IPO
In the analysis reported so far, our research design has focused on studying five years before and after Moody's IPO to account for the fact that the resulting stock market induced pressure to report higher revenues may not have been instantaneous. However, a longer time period opens up the possibility of confounding events. Therefore, we also examine the effect of Moody's going public over a short time period, i.e. from 1999 to 2001, considering ratings for the one year before and after Moody's went public.
The results for both new issues and outstanding issues for this short time period are displayed in panel B of Table 9 . The coefficient on post2000dum for new issues is 0.475 and for outstanding issues is 0.114. Both are highly significant. In the shorter time period, the results again clearly point towards a loosening of Moody's credit ratings after going public. As mentioned earlier, the shorter time period also addresses concerns of biased standard errors due to serial correlation as pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) .
Benchmarking against Fitch
Fitch is currently the third largest credit rating agency in the world. It was acquired by Table 9 ). The coefficient on post2000Dum is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. To capture rating differences on outstanding bonds, we define LeadTimeDiff as the percentage of days in a year that Moody's has a higher rating minus the percentage of the days in the year that Fitch has a higher rating, and reestimate model (2). The coefficient of post2000Dum for this estimation is again positive and highly significant at the 1% level. In summary, even relative to Fitch, Moody's assigned more favorable ratings to new issues as well as to outstanding issues in the years after its IPO in 2000.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate Congressional allegations that going public changed Moody's from a conservative rating agency to one focused on market share and short term profits. To examine this allegation, we benchmark Moody's ratings to those of its main competitor, S&P, which did not undergo a change in its ownership status over this time period. We find significant evidence, both in economic and statistical terms, that Moody's was more likely to assign favorable ratings relative to S&P for new corporate bond issues in the period after its IPO. A similar trend is also seen in the ratings of outstanding bonds, with Moody's being, relative to S&P, significantly more favorable in the years after its IPO. The results also show that Moody's relative favorable ratings after going public were accompanied with a relative lower accuracy. Our results are robust to alternative specifications in the event windows, and to the use of Fitch's ratings as the benchmark.
Although this relative loosening of Moody's credit rating standards after it went public is seen for all bonds, it is significantly more pronounced for corporate bonds issued by large issuers of structured finance products and financial firms. This finding corroborates employees' testimonies at Congressional hearings that the new culture at Moody's was focused on market share and the lower rating standards emanated from the structured products group. The loosening of rating standards in corporate bonds is also significantly greater for large and frequent issuers of corporate bonds and those most likely to gain from a higher rating. In sum, our evidence points to the importance of ownership structure and consequent market pressures on the ratings issued by credit agencies. Table 1 . As smaller numbers correspond to higher ratings, a positive (negative) value of RatingDiff implies that Moody's assigns a higher (lower) rating than S&P. The number on top of each bar represents the number of new bond issues over which the RatingDiff variable was computed every year. In Column I (II), HighConfDum takes the value one if the bond is issued by firms that are large issuers of structured finance products (Financial firms). In Column III (IV) HighConfDum takes the value one if the bond is issued by a large issuer (the issuers' profit margin is above the median for that S&P's rating grade). Other variables included but not reported in the table are IssuerSize (natural log of total market value), Leverage (ratio of longterm debt to total assets), OpMargin (operating income before depreciation divided by sales), Stkreststd ( standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year prior to the issuance), IssueSize (log of the par value of the bond issue), YTM (number of years to maturity), Seniordum (dummy variable that is one for senior debt). All accounting variables are measured in the year prior to the new issue. The number below each estimate of the coefficients is heteroscedasticity adjusted robust p-value. We cluster standard errors by the issuing firm. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table presents results from the OLS regressions where the dependent variable is LeadTimeDif, the fraction of a year where Moody's assigns a higher rating minus the fraction where S&P assigns a higher rating. Post2000Dum is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the years in the post-public period, and zero otherwise. In Column II (III) HighConfDum takes the value one if issuer is a large issuer of structured products (a finance firm). In Column IV(V) HighConfDum takes the value one if issuer is a large issuer of corporate bonds (missed a higher S&P rating). Other variables are defined as in Table 4 . All Models included a constant which has not been reported for brevity. The number below each estimate of the coefficients is heteroscedasticity adjusted robust p-value. We cluster standard errors by the issuing firm. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Post2000dum is a dummy that takes the value one for years after 2000, and zero otherwise. EDF is the expected default frequency estimated using the Black-Scholes-Merton specification. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 4 . The number below each estimate of the coefficients is heteroscedasticity adjusted robust p-value. We cluster standard errors by the issuing firm. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
New , while for Panel B is 1999 -2001 . Panel C presents the results when Fitch's ratings are used as the benchmark over the period 1995 to 2005. We estimate model (1) on the sample of new bond issues, and model (2) on the sample that includes all outstanding issues. The dependent variables for model (1) and model (2) are RatingDiff and LeadTimeDiff, respectively. RatingDiff is the S&P numerical rating minus the Moody's numerical rating. LeadTimeDiff is the fraction of a year where Moody's assigns a higher rating minus the fraction of a year where S&P assigns a higher rating. Post2000Dum is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the years in the postpublic period, and zero otherwise. Other variables are defined as in Table 4 . The number below each estimate of the coefficients is heteroscedasticity adjusted robust p-value. We cluster standard errors by the issuing firm. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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